Thursday 15 December 2011

Monograph Forthcoming? Yes!

Though progress at times may seem almost glacially slow, I continue to work on the chapters of a monograph on Vietnamese grammar that may one day be completed. Over the last months, I have continued work on Chapter 1—A Descriptive Sketch. Click on the link below for the latest version of Part 1 of this chapter (alternatively go to the Monograph page link at top)

Click to download pdf


Comments and suggestions welcome!

Monday 14 November 2011

Unpeeling an onion: what Vietnamese tells us about the lexicon-syntax interface

Last week, I had the great fortune to attend the International Conference on Linguistics Training and Research in Vietnam, held at USSH, VNU, Hanoi. My first visit to Vietnam, I hope the first of many. During my stay, I was able to give two presentations. I'm posting the slides from the first colloquium talk, which will be written up more fully shortly (and essentially a synopsis of Chapter 1 of the elusive, but not quite mythical, monograph). In the meantime, there should be enough on the slides to make for useful reading. If you have comments or questions—about Vietnamese syntax, though not about onions—please get in touch.

Click to view presentation

(I've replaced the html version with a pdf file, which should be easier to read)

Problems with 13 Little Boats

For a number of reasons, I have had cause to go back to—and reformat—a paper on Irish numeral phrases that I presented long ago (in 1995) at a Canadian Linguistics Association Meeting. The paper was to have appeared in the Proceedings, but I have not been able to find any existent copies or links to such. If anyone knows of a link where this publication can be found, I'll take this down; otherwise, it's available here.

Click to access pdf file

Arcane as the topic may seem, the syntax of numeral phrases is, I think, a revealing phenomenon, showing the possible limits of conventional phrase-structure syntax to handle discontinuous dependencies and spreading agreement. It also offers a good treatment of classifier phrases in East Asian languages (developing ideas originally due to Elisabeth Löbel 1990). It was written at a time when I still believed that a purely syntactic solution was the best solution to every problem: I'm less sure now, but it's not a bad technical attempt.

Monday 24 October 2011

Skin Deep…or Fatal: Wishful Thinking and the Logical Implications of Cultural Relativity

Some more thoughts about cultural relativity and perception.

Click here to download pdf file

Over the last couple of years—and in more concentrated fashion in recent months—I have been giving attention to the serious1 psychological literature on cultural relativity/relativism (CR), and especially to reports of significant differences between Western Caucasians and East Asians, with respect to visual perception, discrimination and categorization, and to moral and aesthetic judgments. The familial relevance of such issues should be obvious: if cultural relativism is more than skin deep, then it is important for me to have a greater appreciation of how Japanese people see the world and organize experience if I want to understand those close to me, and help my bicultural children reconcile what are allegedly quite distinct world-views (not that this appears to be a great stretch for them).

Tuesday 11 October 2011

Grammatica una et eadem est...: reflections on language universals and linguistic diversity

This the prefinal draft of a public lecture I'm due to give next week at Kobe College. It continues the discussion in Sapir-Whorf Redux, rehearsing some of the arguments presented there, taking up some other issues, in what is, I hope, a more accessible form (given that the lecture is directed at non-linguists, it had better be).

Click here to download pdf file


Comments welcome, as ever.

Sunday 18 September 2011

Polarity Emphasis and ‘Low Modality’ in Vietnamese and English

This is a pre-final draft of a paper presented at GIST4 (Workshop on Polarity Emphasis) in Ghent. The paper is a revised and refocussed version of my Linguistics article (Duffield 2007), incorporating findings from some more recent work (Duffield & Phan 2010, Duffield, in press). Comments welcome.

Link to pdf file

Thursday 25 August 2011

"Tomorrow, after we got on the boat ..." (Past morphology as anterior))

Recently, I've been posting some of Julian's more interesting grammatical misanalyses. Most of them have been lexical, but the one that I've noticed recently is syntactic and really quite frequent. Julian's 5;2 now, and typically adult-like by most measures, except for some lexical misanalyses, and morphological overgeneralizations of various kinds, especially perfective/passive.

He generally has control of past/non-past and can correctly distinguish preterite/present perfect in production of main clauses. All the more surprising then that he uses preterite forms in adverbial clauses to designate future perfect. So, for example:

"Tomorrow, after we came back from the doctors, can we go on our bikes?"
"Next week, when we got back from Ireland, can I play with Isaac?"

As far as I can judge, all when-(before/after/as soon as) clauses with future reference, where the topic time is further in the future—i.e. future perfect clauses—contain a preterite form.

(This is just like Vietnamese anterior da, except of course, that Julian does not speak or hear Vietnamese. It's not a feature of his other L1 (Japanese), either)

If anyone has similar data, perhaps you could let me know.


Thursday 28 July 2011

Why Shakespeare is wrong about Love

This is a cross-posting of two pieces I posted on the Family blog Devenish, which is now suspended. When I started regular posts on Devenish last year, I wasn't quite sure what the project was. I think I know now: this is part of it.]

...And jealousy, Time and infinite longing. So nothing serious, then. Click to play. 

Let’s start with Shakespeare and me. First, the words of one of his most famous sonnets, which I now recall was read at our wedding ceremony…

Wednesday 22 June 2011

Why can't we talk to each other?: Why can't we listen?

In a very thoughtful review of Fritz Newmeyer's Language Form and Language Function, Martin Haspelmath (2000) poses the (partially rhetorical) question Why can't we talk to each other? which is also the title of the piece. The "we" in question are formalists* and functionalists, who—despite the best efforts of linguists like Newmeyer and Haspelmath—seem locked in a Middle East-style conflict without compromise or meaningful concession. One of the reasons for non-talking, Haspelmath proposes, is that our fundamental goals are incompatible. This may be so, but I think there is a simpler explanation: a conversation requires listeners as well as talkers, and we just don't listen.

Let me climb off the fence for a change, to make clear which kind of non-listening I'm referring to.

Tuesday 21 June 2011

Do Asians really think differently from Westerners? - Revised Version

Link to PDF file


This is the revised draft version of the article on Asian-Western differences in visual recall, which has been resubmitted to Cognitive Linguistics. It should be cited as Tajima, Y. & N. Duffield (2011) On Japanese-Chinese differences in picture description and recall. Ms. Keio University and University of Sheffield. Submitted.

Thursday 16 June 2011

Head-First: On the head-initiality of Vietnamese clauses

Link to PDF file


This is the final draft version of an article on CP and 'Yes-No' questions in Vietnamese that will appear in 2012 in a Mouton volume edited by Daniel Hole and Elisabeth Löbel on the Linguistics of Vietnamese [title forthcoming]. This paper will form the basis of section 1 of Chapter 3 of my forthcoming monograph. This version should be cited as Duffield, Nigel (2011) Head-First: On the head-initiality of Vietnamese clauses, ms. University of Sheffield.

Thursday 9 June 2011

How flabbergasting is Extragrammaticality?

Recently, I have been forced to think a bit harder about the concept of Extra-grammaticality, which is basically the idea that some elements of a linguistic utterance are not analyzed as part of the abstract, underlying sentential representation (even if they are legitimate lexical items that may, on another occasion, be so analyzed). The context for this concern is a paper that I recently submitted to a leading journal, which—the paper, that is—was tossed back at me after being savagely rejected by one of the reviewers. One of the many things the reviewer objected to was a section in which, in passing, I entertained the proposal that utterance final Q-morphemes in East Asian languages such as Vietnamese and Mandarin might be extra-grammatical in the sense defined above; in the particular case at hand,  which concerns the analysis of interrogative không, I was in fact rejecting such a proposal for không. But no matter: the mere suggestion of extra-grammaticality was enough to horrify, indeed flabbergast, the reviewer of the afore-unnamed journạl. Verbatim, if not literally (whatever the literal meaning of flabbergast might be, I think he was exaggerating). Quoth he: (“[The] statement ...that “many languages have lexical elements that are extra-metrical in this sense—present in utterances but not in sentences..."... left me flabbergasted.”

For this, and doubtless other, sounder, reasons, the reviewer was minded to urge rejection of the paper, and the editor duly complied.

Wednesday 8 June 2011

Getting the GIST4 (September 29th-30th)

It will be very good to come back to Belgium, and to linguistics, after too long away. If you are interested why don't you join us...

On 9 Jun 2011, at 00:13, Reiko Vermeulen wrote:

Monday 6 June 2011

Emotional Distance and Deixis

Teaching a subject area that you are relatively unfamiliar with has several advantages, not least of which is that it is is easy to make discoveries, which in turn makes teaching more fun. I'm not pretending, by the way, that these are true discoveries—that is to say, facts previously unknown to linguistic science—only that they are not in the textbook I am teaching from, and that they are new to me.

Here at Kobe College I am teaching a two semester course entitled Meaning and Cognition. For the most part, it is a straight Intro to Semantics course, though in every lesson I try to think of a cognitive angle on a particular topic, as much as anything to inject something interesting into a subject that can be jaw-droppingly dull if not seasoned in some way or other with cute facts.

So today, I was teaching Deixis

Wednesday 25 May 2011

Toucan Triptych (cross-post)

Consider these pictures, taken last weekend at Kobe Kachoen (Bird and Flower Park), our refuge from the miserable Sunday weather. The idea is that you get to interact with birds, and both of the older boys were able to feed and/or hold first owls, then toucans, then other smaller water-fowl. A larger selection of pictures can be found here, but what is most interesting is the following sequence of Julian feeding a toucan (the bird of choice of Guinness drinkers everywhere):


Now it may be pure coincidence or a fevered imagination, but the psychologist in me sees a boy subconsciously imitating a bird: down-up-down (all that is missing is the fruit in Julian's mouth!). Parrot-fashion, if you don't mind awful puns. Mirror Neurons, anyone...?

Wednesday 13 April 2011

Unaccusative Effects in Vietnamese and English: Further evidence for Inner Aspect

[This is a slightly edited version of a paper submitted to a volume out of the 2007 Forces in Grammatical Theory Conference (Paris). The paper brings together material from two recently published articles, a NELS paper from 2005, and an article recently published in an 2011 OUP volume edited by Rafaella Folli and Christiane Ulbrich Interfaces in Linguistics. Considerably more work is necessary to satisfactorily unify these ideas—in particular, the second section needs reworking to convince the sceptics, but it's a start. All comments welcomed!]

Inadvertent Causes and the Unergative-Unaccusative Split in Vietnamese and English

This paper draws together several strands of evidence in support of the claim that two kinds of cause relations are independently represented in phrase-structure. The first of these kinds is the familiar, intentional/volitional cause associated with the thematic relation AGENT, typically represented in the current generative literature as the argument licensed by ‘little v’: in recent years, it has once again become commonplace to assume that this intentional CAUSE is abstractly represented in phrase structure, either as a primitive predicate, or as a relational notion: see Hale and Keyser (1993); Baker (1997); also Pustejovsky (1991), Tenny and Pustejovsky (2000). This paper however focuses on the structural representation of the second type of cause: a less studied relation that that I’ll term INADVERTENT CAUSE (IC), and which—in contrast to its more robust cousin—has generally escaped detailed scrutiny until quite recently.2 The analysis presented here develops a proposal originally articulated by (Travis 2010, 2000, 1991), which associates the IC thematic relation with the specifier position of a VP-internal functional category, namely, Inner Aspect (IAspP). Travis’ proposal is originally motivated by facts from a completely different range of (Western Malayo-Polynesian) languages: to the extent that it extends naturally to the phenomena discussed here, the present work provides confirmation of the profitability of a syntactic approach to inadvertent cause.
Travis’ proposal incorporates two distinct empirical claims. The first of these is that the long-standing bi-partite division of subject arguments—as (underlying) Agents or Themes—should be reinterpreted as a tri-partite division, whereby some cause arguments are merged to an intermediate functional specifier position, situated between ‘little v’ and and the core thematic verb-phrase [Spec, VP]). The second, associated, claim is that this functional projection involves aspectual features of some kind, which predicts that its syntactic behavior should co-vary with the aspectual type of the root predicate. This paper pursues both of these claims independently: section 2 below offers evidence from Vietnamese causative constructions in support of an intermediate specifier position for IC arguments, while section 3 provides evidence from English participial constructions concerning the aspectual nature of this intermediate projection.

1 Preliminaries
Before presenting new data, it is worth drawing attention to some cases that have already received attention in the generative literature, and which draw out the distinction between the more familiar intentional/volitional cause and the IC relation: in each case, the distinction is syntactic in so far as one or other thematic relation is unavailable in a particular structural configuration.
Consider first the Binding contrasts in (1) and (2), which privilege DP subjects bearing the IC relation over agentive subjects. As discussed by (Pesetsky 1995, Harley 1995, and Fujita 1996 amongst others, backwards binding is permitted in the (a) examples, where the subject expresses inadvertent cause, but blocked in the (b) examples, where the surface subject anaphor must be interpreted agentively. Assuming with these previous authors that Binding contrasts are to be explained configurationally—that is, in terms of c-command—such contrasts offer prima facie evidence that inadvertent causes are initially merged prior to the merger of intentional causes (Agents), and that experiencer DPs intervene between the two positions (at whatever point in the derivation Principle A applies).
1. a. ?Each other’s remarks made Bill and Mary laugh.
    b. *Each other’s friends (intentionally/deliberately) made Bill and Mary laugh.
2. a. ?Each other’s pictures annoyed Sue and Mary.
    b. *Each other’s friends (intentionally) annoyed Sue and Mary.
As Fujita and others have pointed out, the paradigm in (1) and (2) extends to the double object constructions shown in (3), where binding facts once again suggest a lower underlying position for inadvertent causes than for Agents. The interesting twist here is that in English more generally—that is to say, in non-binding contexts—intentional agents show a wider distribution than inadvertent causes: evidence for this is offered by the fact that prepositional datives disallow IC subjects. To see this, compare the sentences in (3) and (4):
3. a. ?Each other’s pictures gave Bill and Mary (an idea for) a book.
    b. *Each other’s friends (intentionally) gave Bill and Mary a book.

4. a. Interviewing Nixon gave Mailer a book/a headache.
    b. *Interviewing Nixon gave a book/a headache to Mailer.
Postponing the question of precisely how these English contrasts should be analyzed, let us turn to a syntactic reflex of this thematic distinction in another language variety. The case in question is Travis’ (1994, 2000, 2010) treatment of the verbal prefix (ma)ha in Malagasy. Travis observes that the addition of this aspectual morpheme to certain initially intransitive predicates has a causativizing function. Compare (5a) vs. (5b) below:
5. a. Tsara ny trano. [Malagasy, from Travis (2000)]
        beautiful the house
        ‘The house is beautiful.’

b.  Maha-tsara ny trano ny voninkano.
     PRES.a.ha.beautiful the house the flowers
     ‘The flowers make the house beautiful.’ (literally, ‘..beautified the house’)
c. *Maha-tsara ny trano Rabe.
      PRES.a.ha.beautiful the house Rabe
      ‘Rabe make the house beautiful.’
Though apparently similar to other inchoative-causative alternations, the crucial difference here is that only IC arguments are licensed: the contrast between the acceptable (5b) and the unacceptable examples in (5c) shows that (ma)ha is incompatible with agentive cause arguments. Two points should be borne in mind. The first is that there is no general syntactic constraint blocking the introduction of agentive arguments in Malagasy—this constraint is specific to a particular transitivizing prefix. Second, the IC relation is linked here to a prefix that is properly treated as expressing an aspectual function: with other predicates, the addition of the same prefix serves to change the (Vendlerian) aspectual class of the base predicate, converting activities into achievements, as shown by the alternations in (6). In other words, there is a direct association in Malagasy between the IC thematic relation and a particular kind of aspectual semantic function, which Travis glosses as ‘[+telic]’:
6. a. mijery 'to look at' ~ mahajery 'to notice' [Travis (2000)(Phillips 2001)]
b. mandinika 'to examine' ~ mahadinika 'to remark'
In Travis’ analysis, this association is cashed out syntactically: ha is analyzed as heading a VP-internal Aspect projection, with the argument interpreted as the clausal subject in (5b) initially merged as the specifier of this head. This is schematized in (7):

7.


Two aspects of this analysis are especially relevant here: first, the articulation of a VP-internal argument position intermediate between that associated with prototypical Agents and that of Themes, thus presenting a three-way contrast in transitivity in place of the standard dichotomy; second, the explicit association of this intermediate position with aspectual features that are logically independent of thematic relations. With this in mind, let us turn to the new data. In the next section I present some new evidence from Vietnamese consistent with this intermediate specifier position: just as in Malagasy, Vietnamese causatives exhibit a thematic restriction that systematically excludes embedded subjects from being interpreted agentively. The section that follows then presents new data from English bearing on the syntactic relationship between transitivity and Inner Aspect: on the one hand, these data clearly support the idea that such a relationship exists; on the other, they challenge the view assumed by almost all commentators—see also also Folli and Harley (2005), Schäfer (2008)—that telicity is the key aspectual property underlying such alternations.

2 Vietnamese Causatives
In this section, the concern is with constraints on causativization in Vietnamese. In line with other morphologically isolating languages, Vietnamese has no synthetic causatives. Instead, causativization is invariably expressed periphrastically: the introduction of an additional subject argument (DP1) must be licensed by a higher causative predicate (V1) làm (which otherwise functions as a lexical light verb meaning ‘do, make’).
The most immediately significant fact about simple làm causatives in Vietnamese is their incompatibility with (already) transitive or clearly unergative V2s: so, for example, làm cannot be added to a base predicate to derive the equivalent of ‘John made [the girls help him]’ or ‘John made [the child sing]’, as shown by the unacceptability of the examples in (8) below. Instead, làm combines exclusively with monovalent predicates whose arguments are non-agentive, as is the case for the core unaccusatives exemplified in (9) and (10) below. Notice that with such predicates the (apparently) inverted order [DP1 V1 V2 DP2] is clearly preferred over the canonical [DP V] order, though both orders are grammatically acceptable:
8. a. ?*Tôi làm [đứa con gái giúp anh ấy].
            I make cls. cls. girl help prn dem2
            ‘I make the girl help him.’
b. ?*Tôi làm [đứa con gái nhảy/hát/ngủ].
        I make cls. cls. girl dance/sing/sleep
        ‘I make the girl dance/sing/sleep.’

9. a. Tôi làm gẫy cái que.
        I make break cls stick
       ‘I broke the stick.’
b. Tôi làm rách tờ giấy.
     I make torn cls paper
    ‘I tore the sheet of paper.’

10. a. (?)Tôi làm cái que gẫy.
             I make cls. stick break
            ‘I broke the stick.’

 b. (?)Tôi làm tờ giấy rách.
         I make sheet paper torn
        ‘I tore the sheet of paper.’
A less obvious interpretive fact about the examples in (9) and (10) is that grammatically acceptable làm causatives receive by default an indirect interpretation: that is to say, the matrix subject is normally interpreted as the inadvertent cause of the event: a ‘salient participant’, rather than an Agent. Notice that in contrast to the English periphrastic causative, this does not imply that the subject has any less involvement in the core event, only that there is less intentionality on the subject’s part. For this reason, a better translation of (10a), for example, might be through the ‘Ethical Dative' construction: ‘The stick broke on me.’ The interpretive parallels with the Malagasy paradigm in (5) above should be clear.
Matters become interesting when one considers the paradigm more closely: in particular, when one considers V2 predicates that are neither the excluded ‘core unergatives’ in (8), nor the core unaccusatives in (9), which show apparently inverted [DP1 V1 V2 DP2] word-order. The structural representation in (7), with causative làm projected under V1, directly predicts the existence of an intermediate set of grammatical V2 predicates: those whose sole argument is involved but non-volitional (in other words IC); these should obligatorily appear following làm but preceding V2. The sentences in (11)-(14) directly bear out this prediction: the examples in (11) show that predicates that are typically classed as unergative, but which—in contrast to example (8b) above—are uncontrolled, may be causativized; the examples in (12) show that even typically agentive predicates such as those in (8b) may be causativized if it is clear that the action is non-volitional/uncontrolled by the participant—compare the ungrammatical (8b) with that in (12), where ‘girl’ is replaced by ‘puppet’. The examples in (13) demonstrate that inverted order is strongly dispreferred in all of these cases, in clear contrast to the core unaccusative examples in (9) and (10):
11. a. Tôi làm đứa con trai khóc. ([DP V1 DP V2])
          I make cls. cls. male cry
        ‘I made the boy cry.’

b. Tôi làm đứa con trai cười.
      I make cls. cls. male laugh
     ‘I made the boy laugh.’

12. ?Tôi làm con búp-bê nhảy/hát.
         I make cls puppet dance/sing
        ‘I make the puppet dance/sing.’

13. a. *Tôi làm khóc đứa con trai. ([*DP V1 V2 DP])
           I make cry CLS. CLS. male
          ‘I made the boy cry.’

b. *Tôi làm cười đứa con trai.
       I make laugh cls cls. male
       ‘I made the boy laugh.’

c. *Tôi làm nhảy/hát con búp-bê.
      I make dance/sing cls. puppet
     ‘I make the puppet dance/sing.’
Pursuing the issue further, the examples in (14) below reveal a similar split among the set of predicates normally classed as unaccusative: even though—as we saw in (9) above—inversion is strongly preferred in cases where the causee undergoes a radical and permanent change of state, it is dispreferred where the causee is merely the ‘involved participant’ in the event:
14. a. Tôi làm (?ngã) thang-be (ngã).
           I make (fall ) boy (fall)
           ‘I made the boy fall.’

b. Tôi làm (?biến-mất) thang-be (biến-mất).
     I make (disappear) boy (disappear)
     ‘I made the boy disappear.’
This paradigm demonstrates that the traditional dichotomy between unergative and unaccusative predicates is unhelpful, at least for Vietnamese: moreover—given the contrasts between examples (8) and (12)—it suggests that the terms ‘unergative’ and ‘unaccusative’ cannot denote inherent and immutable properties of lexical stems/roots, but must refer instead to different patterns of syntactic projection, with thematic relations being read off different Specifier-Head configurations, as proposed by Hale and Keyser (1993), Baker (1997) amongst others.
Travis’ tripartite structure, by contrast, captures the paradigm extremely well: the interpretation of arguments projected to the intermediate [Spec, Asp] position as ICs directly explains the structural conflation—or rather, unification—of “more unaccusative unergatives” (12) with “more unergative unaccusatives” (14), both being realized as preverbal DP2s. Furthermore, if one assumes that làm is projected under V1 within a monoclausal structure, the structure in (15) explains not only the preverbal vs. postverbal distribution of DP2 arguments—as participants (ICs) vs. Themes—but also the impossibility of transitive/unergative complements *(8): làm cannot take a uncontrolled unergative predicate as a complement since the sole argument of such a predicate (prior to causativization) is normally projected to a position above that of làm, i.e., to [Spec,VP1]: that is, it competes for the initial merge position of the clausal subject:



Thus, these Vietnamese data seem to offer clear, independent support for the first part of Travis’ proposal, namely, that IC arguments are projected to an intermediate specifier position below that of intentional Causers/Agents but above that of Themes.
For evidence in support of the second part of the proposal—viz., that this thematic position is linked to a projection with aspectual properties—we turn now to English, this time to a previously unremarked constraint on adjective formation with English present participles.

3 Dancing Girls and Flying Squirrels: Constraints on Adjective Formation
There is a long tradition of work, dating back at least to Jespersen (1940), that documents and/or attempts to explain an asymmetry in the distribution of English past participles, such that typically unergative participles are prevented from functioning as pre-nominal modifiers: see, for example, Jespersen (1940), Lakoff (1965/1970), Bresnan (1982, 1985, 2001, 1982), Levin & Rappaport (1986), Langacker (1991), Haspelmath (1993), Ackerman and Goldberg (1996). This constraint is illustrated by the contrasts in (16):
16. a. the frozen river/ a fallen leaf/ a broken spoke
      b. *the run man/*a coughed patient/*a swum contestant
In previous work, I have sought to draw attention to a more subtle interpretive contrast among present participles running in the opposite direction. In Duffield (2005), it is claimed that typically unergative present participles are able to form adjectives with dispositional (property/atemporal) readings, and thus may enter into lexical compounds, whereas typically unaccusative participles may not, being forced to retain their verbal (or temporally-bound) status. Before articulating the analysis of this constraint with reference to the Inner Aspect projection, let us consider some relevant data, beginning with the sentences in (17) and (18):
17. a. She wants to buy a burning candle. [*DR/okBR ]
      b. They didn’t want to have a crying baby. [okDR/okBR]

18. a. He found the burning candle. [*DR/okBR/okIB]
      b. They found the crying baby. [okDR/okBR/okIB].6
The observational claim is that the (a) and (b) examples in (17) and (18) crucially differ with respect to TEMPORAL ANCHORING, in the sense of Klein (1994, 1998, 2006): whereas the temporal value of unaccusative predicates such as burning is obligatorily linked to some Topic Time in the immediate discourse, unergative participles such as crying may also be interpreted dispositionally, as properties, temporally independent of any Topic Time. In this respect, crying is ambiguous in a way that burning is not: for (17a) to be true the candle must be burning at the time of purchase, but this is not the case in (17b), where the baby must only have the habit of crying more than is usual for babies. To better appreciate this contrast, compare the examples in (19) and (20):
19. a. I'd like to buy a *melting/soft cheese. (cf. a cheese that melts easily).
      b. Don't buy lenses with *breaking glass; only buy specially toughenecd glass, or plastic ones. (cf. brittle glass, also “breaking saddle” — see below)
      c. Do you have *burning material in that waste-paper basket? (cf. flammable material)

20. a. I'd like to buy a rocking chair, a whistling kettle.
      b. Hire non-singing (i.e., instrumental) bands for your event.
      c. Do you have any chatting room-mates in your house?
Example (19a) is perfectly acceptable with a temporally-bound reading; that is, if it is my wish to purchase a cheese that is melting at the time. What this example does not mean is that it is my wish is to buy a type of cheese, in whatever state at time of purchase, that has the property of melting easily: Raclette, as it might be, as opposed to Monterey Jack. Likewise, were it acceptable, breaking glass could refer to those types of glass that break easily—compare the acceptable pre-nominal adjectives fragile or brittle, or the equally acceptable post-nominal relative. Again, (19b) and (19c) are fully acceptable with a temporally-bound reading: although it may be strange to buy a product that is breaking at the time of purchase, (19d) is perfectly acceptable if the speaker sees smoke emanating from the waste-paper basket. No similar constraint applies to the examples in (20).
A point to stress is that the failure of predicates of this type to form dispositional adjectives is not due to pragmatics: this is shown by the fact that for every instance in (19) where the dispositional reading for an unaccusative participle is blocked, an acceptable paraphrase or equivalent bare adjective is available.
The interpretive difference between core unergative vs. core unaccusative participles is reflected in contrasting patterns of lexicalization (or perhaps is reflective of such patterns, depending on the grammatical theory one assumes). For present purposes, a participle is operationally defined as lexicalized just in case:
  • (i) it has an entry as an adjectival participle (ppl.a.) in the OED (online edition) that is independent of the entry for the verb stem; 
  • (ii) at least one sub-entry is not listed as obsolete; 
  • (iii) at least one sub-entry can be directly paraphrased by a relative clause (...that X’s).
A survey of the 68 monovalent predicates examined in Sorace (2000), plus a number of others, reveals that unergative participles with dispositional readings are lexicalized significantly more often than unaccusatives.9 The distinction is not absolute, since there are isolated collocations with unaccusative predicates ('BE' predicates, in Sorace’s terms): these include Dying God, Falling Leaf, and Burning Bush. Nevertheless, the distribution is heavily skewed in favor of HAVE participles.
Furthermore, most of the cited collocations with BE participles involve the ‘other’ thematic relationships discussed in more detail below: whereas a weeping ash is one that figuratively weeps, a wilting coefficient doesn't itself wilt, nor does a descending letter descend (rather, part of the letter descends below a fixed height).
Finally, listed collocations formed from BE participles tend to be of very low frequency and restricted to specific registers; Falling Leaf is a good example of this, referring as it does to a particular aerobatic trick. By contrast, collocations formed from HAVE participles show up in a much wider range of registers and have markedly higher token frequencies.
Notice once again that there is no pragmatic or logical reason why many of these present
participles should not allow a dispositional reading. In principle, for example, one could have coined the term sinking ship for submarine, or subsisting farmer instead of subsistence farmer; persisting headaches might compete with persistent headaches, and so forth, yet the former term of each pair only admits the temporally-bound reading.
Also, even where unaccusative participles are listed as a sub-entry of the verb, their interpretation is invariably temporally-bound (verbal), rather than dispositional (adjectival). This is illustrated by the examples in (21):
21. a. 1848 MACAULAY Hist. Eng. I. 182 Indications of a coming storm.
b. 1848 MILL Pol. Econ. III. xxiv. §3 The speculative holders are unwilling to sell in a falling market.
c. 1876 FREEMAN Norm. Conq. IV. 73 Norwich, with its newly rising castle, was put under his special care.
d. 1884 Century Mag. Jan. 356/2 Wilting flowers are hardly appropriate to a steamship.
e. 1704 RAY in Lett. Lit. Men (Camden) 206, I look upon my self as a dying man.
f. 1853 R. S. SURTEES Sponge's Sp. Tour xli. (1893) 217 The staying guests could not do much for the good things set out.
g. 1859 MILL Liberty i. (1865) 5 The still subsisting habit of looking on the government as representing an opposite interest to the public.
h. 1980 G. M. FRASER Mr American II. xvii. 322 Mr Asquith...would find himself out of office, and the ticking bomb of Ireland could be hastily passed to his successor.
As just mentioned, unaccusatives are not absolutely barred from forming dispositional adjectives. The constraint is more subtle: viz., unaccusatives cannot form dispositional adjectives that are transparent in terms of their thematic relations: Whereas unergative participles are typically interpreted as bearing the same thematic relationship to the modified head noun as the base verb does to its sole argument (X-ing Y = Y that X’s), the head nouns in collocations involving unaccusative participles are either interpreted as instrumental arguments, or as arguments bearing some ‘other’ thematic relation, as in (22) below; alternatively, as in (23) and (24), they are coerced into ‘inadvertent cause’ readings with a separate object (implicit in (23), explicit in (24). In all cases, the directly corresponding inchoative reading is blocked.
22. a. I'd like to get a melting iron/knife. (= an iron used for melting sth.)
      b. He drove her to breaking point. (= point at which s.o. breaks)
      c. The conjuror performed the usual vanishing tricks. (the trick doesn’t
vanish).
     d. America is the Melting Pot of cultures. (the pot doesn’t melt)

23. a. sinking-verbal ships (= temporally-bound = ships that are themselves sinking)
      b. ?sinking-adjectival ships (= dispositional = ships that cause others to sink: e.g., battleships, not submarines)
In (22a), a melting iron is not one that itself melts, but one that serves to melt something else; similarly, in (22b)-(22c) it is not the point that breaks or trick that vanishes.
Alternatively, unaccusative participles can evade the thematic restriction through overt causativization, that is to say, by incorporating a Theme nominal into the derived adjective. This process is illustrated in (24):
24. heart-breaking stories/mind-bending drugs/bulb-growing countries
Aside from usage statistics, the split between unergative and unaccusative participles is reinforced by three other kinds of distributional evidence. First, where a dispositional reading is intended the participle in unergative A-N collocations attracts lexical (compound) stress : as the contrasts in (25) and (26) show, this is not available to the few unaccusative participle-N collocations listed in the OED.
25. a. 'Rocky the Flying Squirrel' wasn't in fact a Flying Squirrel.
      b. Those dancing girls aren't dancing girls: the dancing girls are sitting over there!
      c. Don't confuse that running back with the running back: they're different players (in different sports).
26. a. The Falling Leaf is not a falling leaf; it's an aerobatic stunt.
      b. A blooming letter is not the same thing as a blooming (‘bloomin’) letter.
      c. In some cases, it’s not the staying horse that wins, but the staying horse.
       d. On one side of the parapet was a disappearing gun; on the other, a Disappearing gun, which happened not to be disappearing that day.
The exclusive ability of more unergative participles to enter into lexical compounding and thus to attract lexical stress is directly reflected in an obvious distributional difference: viz., only (dispositional) unergatives can appear to the right of prenominal adjectives denoting nationality, which is normally taken to be that class of adjectives positioned closest to the N head: see Sproat and Shih (1991), Cinque (1994, 2005), amongst others). The examples in (29) show that certain unergative participles can in fact appear twice in the same phrase: to the left of the nationality adjective with a temporally-bound reading; to the right with a dispositional reading (attracting compound stress):
27. a. The falling British [ inflation-rate/?*The British [falling inflation-rate
      b. The rising Japanese [ yen/?*The Japanese [ rising yen
      c. The disappearing Vulgarian [ diplomats/?*The Vulgarian [disappearing diplomats.

28. a.  The singing English nuns (BR only)/The English singing nuns (DR only)
      b. *The weeping Irish willow/The Irish weeping willow
29. a. The Canadian running back/The running Canadian back
       b. The running Canadian running back
The examples in (30) and (31) below highlight an additional difference between unergative and unaccusative participles, namely, that unergatives, in contrast to unaccusatives, show no contradiction under sentential negation. This follows from their ambiguous status: the (verbal) temporal reading is not in conflict with the adjectival property reading:
30. a. #This burning candle isn't burning (now).
      b. #He watched a burning candle, but it wasn’t burning that night.
      c. #He waited for an arriving plane that never arrived.

31. a. Those crying children aren't crying (now).
      b. He watched the Singing Nuns, but they weren’t singing that night.
      c. This Snapping Turtle isn't snapping (at the moment).
Summarizing the discussion thus far, various kinds of evidence show that more unergative present participles may function as prenominal adjectives—and thus enter nominal compounds—whereas more unaccusative ones may not (unless they incorporate a separate Theme argument). Prima facie, this constraint is puzzling, not least because, as was noted earlier, adjectival past participles show precisely the opposite constraint: compare again the examples in (16) above, repeated here for convenience:
16. a. the frozen river/ a fallen leaf/ a broken spoke
      b. *the run man/*a coughed patient/*a swum contestant
Under the traditional dichotomous view of the unergative-unaccusative distinction, this contrast between present and past participles is paradoxical since, if the explanation for the effects discussed here is a structural/thematic one—as I assume—it cannot simply be the standard explanation for adjectival past participles run backwards, that is, ‘before passivization’. This is because, as Haspelmath (1993) points out, most structural/thematic approaches account for the contrast between (16a) and (16b) above by claiming that only THEME arguments—alternatively, only the underlying objects of telic predicates—are accessible for this type of modification, with the sole arguments of unergatives being either of the wrong lexical type or projected too high in the thematic structure. If this explanation carried over to active participles, we would expect to see either the same thematic restrictions applying here—that is, incorrectly excluding unergatives—or conceivably no restriction, with unpassivized unergatives remaining low enough to be accessible for modification. Thus, the solution to the present participles problem also forces a reconsideration of previous analyses of the past participle alternation in (16).
By contrast, Travis’ tri-partite phrase-structure proposal in (15), supplemented by a number of additional assumptions, provides a solution to the opposing restrictions on both present and past participles that resolves this paradox whilst simultaneously tying the IC thematic relation directly to a syntactic position that is aspectual (in the most obvious sense of hosting aspectual morphology).
A basic assumption underlying the present analysis is that that the interpretive ambiguity between temporally-bound vs. dispositional readings for prenominal participles stems directly from a categorial structural ambiguity between pre-nominal verbal participles and prenominal bare adjectives. In the case of the (unrestricted) temporally bound reading, I assume that pre-nominal participles project exactly the same verbal structure as they do in predicative position; by contrast, the dispositional reading arises whenever participles are converted to and projected as bare adjectives (where this is permitted). Notice that I assume that this conversion process is a syntactic one, albeit covert and within the lexicon: in other words, it is a piece of l-syntax, in the sense of Hale & Keyser (1993).
To a first approximation, let us assume, following Reuland (1983), that the representation of verbal present participles involves a functional head containing the formal features of the –ing affix, as well as all the phrase structure governed by this head. Reuland’s original structure is diagrammed in (32a) below: for present purposes, ‘Infl’ may be re-interpreted as corresponding to Travis’ Outer Aspect (OAsp) projection, as in (32b).



As for the projection of bare attributive adjectives, I follow Higginbotham (1985), in which it is claimed that the representation of adjectival modifiers involve at an open argument position with which the modified head noun must be identified, as shown in (33)—see Higginbotham (1985: example [45]). Note that in contrast to (32), participles realized as bare adjectives project no functional structure. The claim is that unergative participles functioning as pre-nominal modifiers are structurally ambiguous between these two modes of projection (s-syntactic vs. l-syntactic projections, respectively):

Of course, much hangs here on the correct interpretation of the anachronistically labeled ‘VP’ node, an issue addressed directly below. Nevertheless, if the more general assumption is correct, then the right analytic question is why some participles may undergo conversion to adjectives, while others cannot. The answer I suggest is that the sole arguments of active unergatives are in the right structural position to undergo l-syntactic conversion, whereas those of “core unaccusatives” are not.
With the previous discussion of Vietnamese causatives in mind, assume now that a three-way distinction in argument projection is likewise implicated in the unergative-unaccusative split in English, such that in verbal projections:
  • (i) arguments of V1 are merged to [Spec,V1], interpreted as AGENTS
  • (ii) arguments of (Inner) Asp are merged to [Spec, Asp], interpreted as INADVERTENT CAUSE/KEY PARTICIPANTS
  • (iii) arguments of the root verb are merged as sisters to V2, interpreted as THEMES
As was the case in Vietnamese, suppose that for core unaccusatives, only the third type of projection is possible: by contrast, for “unergatives”, either of the former modes of projection are available: they may initially project either as canonical transitives (option 1) or as Inadvertent Causes (option 2), as in (34) cf. (15) above:

Given this structural representation, the various constraints on participial adjectives observed above follow fairly directly if one assumes the following lexical constraint on participle to adjective conversion:
35. Unique Mapping Constraint on Adjective Formation
The argument mapped to the argument position of the adjective template must be projected into the [Spec, Asp’] position of the participle at the point of lexical conversion.
Combining this constraint with the phrase-structure in (33) has the following consequences. In the first place we can immediately derive the core unaccusative-unergative contrasts in (17-20) above: unless there is some reason to raise ‘Theme’ arguments through [Spec, Asp]—such arguments will not occur in this position in l-syntax, and adjective formation will be blocked by the UMC. This is schematized in (36):
The two exceptional contexts where arguments of unaccusative predicates may be converted to adjectives are precisely those where there is evidence of some kind of argument raising: either the regular case of passivization—this is the case of adjectival past participles in (16)—or the (apparently more lexical) instances of Theme-incorporation, as in (24) above.
Taking the passive participles first, a possible derivation is given in (37) below. As should be clear, this is no more than a modification of the standard generative analysis of passive (Baker, Johnson, and Roberts 1989), such that the abstract passive/perfective -EN morpheme is initially associated with Inner Aspect rather than with V1/‘little v’, as is more commonly assumed:

With this revision, Baker, Johnson, and Roberts (1989)’s analysis of verbal passives extends to the analysis of prenominal participles: unergative predicates (16b) are correctly excluded—the ‘external’ theta-role normally being assigned to the argument in [Spec, ASP] is assigned to the passive morpheme, and thus unable to license any ‘external’ argument, also blocking the adjectival conversion; by contrast, unaccusative predicates are permitted in both their verbal and adjectival forms in virtue of covert raising to/through [Spec, Asp] in l-syntax. This verbal vs. adjectival contrast is exemplified in (38) and (39), respectively, where once again the two forms are disambiguated by their distribution with respect to nationality adjectives.
38. a. the frozen Norwegian lakes
      b. the burnt French toast
      c. the broken Japanese videocamera
39. a. the Norwegian frozen yogurt
      b. the French burnt ochre is superior to the Spanish tint
      c. the Japanese broken hearts club
Notice that this analysis reconciles two traditionally diametrically opposed perspectives on passivization: passive as a lexical vs. syntactic operation. On this analysis, passivization is lexical in the sense that it takes place in the lexicon, early enough to feed adjective conversion; at the same time, however, it is syntactic in the sense that it operates over the same structures and disposes of the same mechanisms that constitute the overt syntax of more isolating languages, such as Vietnamese (as we saw in section 2 above).
Turning to the examples illustrated in (24) above involving Theme incorporation, these are now reanalyzed as instances of overt (l-syntactic) raising, as in (40) (‘mind-bending drugs’):


Finally, this analysis explains why it is that those marginal cases where unaccusative predicates may function as prenominal adjectives involve transitivization of the predicate such that the head noun is interpreted as an IC of the process denoted by that predicate, rather than as the Theme: that is, for example, why a breaking saddle is one used for breaking (in) horses, not one that breaks:


Summarizing this section: the distribution and interpretation of English prenominal participles—especially, the opposing constraints applying to present vs. perfective participles—offers direct supports for the tri-partite structural representation proposed by Travis (op cit.), insofar as the availability in English of an intermediate specifier position within the extended VP offers a straightforward explanation for what would otherwise be a paradoxical flip in the possibilities for prenominal modification, depending on the aspectual properties of the predicate. The additional value of the English data is that the licensing properties of this projection are directly linked to an uncontroversially aspectual element, namely, the perfective morpheme –EN. Thus, the English data provide support not only for the existence of such a position, but also the justification of its syntactic label (Inner Aspect).
Before closing this section, one feature of the analysis requires some additional comment. Previously, in setting out Travis’ analysis of the Malagasy prefix ha-, it was noted that this morpheme was taken to be an exponent of the semantic feature [+telic]; subsequently, it was also observed in passing that other researchers of this have concluded that telicity is the determining feature of relevant alternations of this type.
The data presented here, however, cast doubt on this conclusion (assuming of course that the phenomena are to be handled by a parallel treatment). This is because the contrast analyzed here involves an ‘Anti-telicity’ effect: lexically, the participles that permit adjective formation are unergative, a class of predicate normally assumed to be atelic; by contrast, unaccusative predicates, which are generally classed as telic, resist adjective formation (unless passivized).
The force of this evidence is compounded by the fact that experiencer predicates display a similar contrast with respect to adjective formation: participles formed from Object Experiencer verbs, such as annoy, exciting, interest, and so forth, permit dispositional readings (42), whereas Subject Experiencer participles are grammatically unacceptable (43ab), unless—like unaccusatives—they are passivized or contain incorporated Theme arguments (43cd):
42. a. an interesting fact
      b. an amusing story
      c. a frightening incident
      d. an entertaining stunt

43. a. She is a *(god-)fearing woman (cf. fearful)
      b. *He was an envying man (cf. envious)
      c. *Loathing or hating people should be avoided if possible.
      d. an *(all)-knowing God
As discussed at greater length in Duffield (2005, esp. in prep), this contrast is not fully parallel to the unaccusative vs. unergative split outlined above, in that object experiencer modifiers are still restricted to the verbal (left-hand) side of nationality adjectives, and bare subject experiencer predicates are excluded entirely (by whatever constraint prevents stative predicates from combining with -ing in English). Nevertheless, the fact that two subclasses of lexically atelic predicates are implicated with the IAsP projection argues against the idea that telicity is the relevant semantic feature. Though more work is necessary to establish this, it is possible that a lexically more neutral feature, such as perfectivity, or ‘boundedness’, may be at work here (boundedness being an intrinsic feature of telicity, but not the other way around).

Conclusion
This article has focused attention on a less scrutinized causal relation, that of Inadvertent Cause (IC), and on its representation in phrase-structure. The investigations summarized here provide some independent empirical evidence in support of the specific phrasal architecture proposed in Travis (2000, 2010), involving an Inner Aspect projection below the position of intentional Cause (V1, v), suggesting that the conclusions previously arrived at on the basis of Western Malayo-Polynesian have quite general application. The data presented here also speak to the question of the unaccusative-unergative distinction, challenging the more standard assumption of an inherently lexical dichotomy between two kinds of predicate—for example, in terms of inherent telicity: see (Chierchia 1989), (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995), amongst others—replacing this binary with a tripartite structural account of unaccusativity, where thematic relations are read off syntactic representation; see also (Haertl 2003). Overall then, the article reaffirms the profitability of syntactic, as opposed to semantic or pragmatic, accounts of such thematic alternations: cf. Narasimhan, Di Tomaso, and Verspoor (2007).

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Notes
1. Such approaches to the representation of (intentional) CAUSE resurrect certain core aspects of the Generative Semantics tradition, as represented, for example, by (Lakoff 1965/1970; McCawley 1968).  Following the demise of Generative Semantics, these ideas were taken up by semanticists, especially (Dowty 1979) and (Parsons 1990), then partially ‘re-imported’ into syntax by Pustejovsky (1991) amonst others: see Travis (2010) for a clear overview.
 2. A reviewer draws attention to more recent work on the topic, of which I was unaware, including that of Kallulli (2006), Schäfer (2009) and Solstad (2009).
 3. There are in fact two similar, but structurally distinct, analytic causative constructions in Vietnamese: ‘simple’ làm causatives on the one hand, and ‘complex’ causatives introduced by (làm) cho, on the other. The focus here is on the former type, which exhibit the thematic constraints predicted under the Inner Aspect analysis: in Duffield (in press, also in prep.), I provide evidence that the complex causatives implicate a fundamentally different, bi-clausal analysis, which explains their insensitivity to these thematic constraints (cf. (Kwon 2004)).
 4. This also holds for Thai causatives, as discussed in (Vichit-Vadakan 1976).
 5. As ever, matters are somewhat more complex than presented here. In particular, the present analysis does not directly explain the ‘indirect’ reading of Vietnamese causatives mentioned earlier. It also seems to exclude—falsely, as it turns out—làm causatives involving inadvertent DP1 subjects with ‘participant DP2 complements’ (the equivalent of ‘The wind blew the boy over’). Both of these issues are discussed at greater length in (Duffield in press).
 6. BR = (temporally) Bound Reading, DR= Dispositional (adjectival) Reading. Discussion of the contrast is complicated by the fact that specific, especially definite, determiners introduce an additional (prior) Topic Time to which the event denoted by the verbal participle may be anchored: call this the INDEPENDENTLY BOUND reading (IB). For ease of exposition, therefore, I will ignore specific interpretations/contexts: indefinite determiners should be interpreted as non-specific.
 7. For many speakers, collocations such as melting cheese are acceptable with a dispositional reading. However, the crucial point to observe is that this reading is only available with a ‘coerced causee’ reading: a melting cheese in this sense is one that can be melted, not one that is predisposed to melt (intransitively), whereas a squeaking chair is one that squeaks; see below.
 8. Similar remarks apply to She loves the sound of breaking glass vs. She loves breaking glass: whereas the former sentence may have a generic reading since breaking glass simply modifies the noun sound, the latter sentence can only be interpreted either with a temporally-bound reading ‘She loves it (at the time) when glass is breaking,’ or (much preferred) with the coerced causative/Theme reading, where breaking is reanalyzed as a transitive.
 9. The sampled set comprised the following predicates (non-italicized items from (Sorace 2000), italicized items added): come, arrive, leave, fall (non-agentive); rise, descend, ascend, become; wilt, bloom, decay, die; appear, emerge, disappear, happen, occur; stay, remain, last, survive, persist; exist, be, belong, sit, lie, seem, suffice, subsist, correspond, consist; tremble, waver, shiver, skid, weep; cough, sweat, sneeze, vomit; ring, resound, rumble, toll, tick, shin; run, roll, dance, swim; chat, work, blow, spit, snap; sleep: yield, surrender, triumph, prevail, join; break, melt, freeze, boil, burn, thaw.
10. Again, to the extent that a dispositional reading is possible for ‘sinking ship’, the available interpretation is the coerced causer reading: a destroyer, say, rather than a submarine. Note also that some speakers allow migrating bird with a dispositional reading; for others though, this participle is temporally bound; for these speakers only the alternative migratory is possible.
 11. From the TV animation series Rocky and his Friends and The Bullwinkle Show: I am grateful to David Birdsong for this example.
 12. I assume that the participial alternant, which is the only possible realisation for unaccusative predicates, projects ‘too much structure’ to permit compounding.  In other words, the restriction is another reflex of a more general constraint on compounding: the NO PHRASE CONSTRAINT of Botha (1983); see also Lieber (1988, 1992), Spencer (1991): see below.
 13. As a reviewer points out, this approach finds close similarities with work by Borer (Borer 1995), and especially with Embick (2004), a paper that I was previously unaware of.
 14. To avert any misunderstanding, note that the assumption is that the perfective morpheme is associated with the Inner Aspect projection. As for the progressive morpheme ing, however, I assume that this is associated with a VP-external functional projection, that which Reuland (1983) labels ‘Infl’, and which Travis would term ‘Outer Aspect’: see (33) above.

Tuesday 22 February 2011

Sapir-Whorf Complete

Chinese Garden, Montreal Botanical Gardens

This paper is now complete, all bar the conclusion. As I do not plan any further revisions to the text up to that point, I have prepared a pdf file, which can be downloaded from here:

* Download the final draft

If you wish to comment on the paper, please do so here. If you wish to cite the paper, it should be cited as Duffield, Nigel. 2011. Sapir-Whorf Redux: What might be right about Linguistic Relativity. Manuscript, University of Sheffield.

Tuesday 8 February 2011

Honesty and Wealth (cross posting)

The path down from a small shrine on Rokko Mountain
In constructing the piece that will follow on the heels of this one—see, dogs already!—I was reminded of this quotation by Bertrand Russell:
No matter how eloquently a dog may bark, he cannot tell you that his parents were poor but honest.
Poor, but honest?! Shouldn't that be the other way around? The truth conditions might be the same, but the implicatures are quite different. What was Bertie thinking of?!

Thursday 13 January 2011

Recommended Reading 1

Over the last few months, quite a few of you have been kind enough to read some of the other posts on this site. Today, I have no particular axe to grind, though I'm mindful of the other pieces that are still pending, including the final section of Sapir-Whorf Redux, which should appear early next week.) Instead, nach dem Motto* "Anyone can do any amount of work, provided it isn't the work they are supposed to be doing that the time (Robert Benchley)," I'd like to use this piece to draw your attention to a writer and critic who—in the world of linguistics, at any rate—has been sorely neglected in recent years. This is a real pity, not just because it's a waste of everyone's time to start thinking about linguistic issues from scratch when someone else has done the groundwork, but also because he writes so well: whether scathing or complimentary, his prose is unfailingly precise and elegantly constructed.

The writer in question is George Steiner. You can find out more about him  by following this link. Rather than rehearsing that description, here are three extended quotes from Language and Silence, which I happen to have in front of me. The collection After Babel is more relevant still, but I don't have a copy to hand.

  • From Humane Literacy
When he looks back, the critic sees a eunuch's shadow. Who would be a critic if he could be a writer? Who would hammer out the subtlest insight into Dostoyevsky if he could weld an inch of the Karamazovs, or argue the poise of Lawrence if he could shape the free gust of life in The Rainbow. All great writing stems from le dur désir de durer, the harsh contrivance of spirit against death, the hope to overreach time by force of creation. 'Brightness falls from the air'; five words and a trick of darkening sound. But they have outworn three centuries. Who would choose to be a literary critic if he could set verse to sing, or compose, out of his own mortal being, a vital fiction, a character that will endure. Most men have their dusty survivance in old telephone directories (it is a mercy that these are kept at the British Museum): there is in the literal fact of their existence, less of life's truth and harvest than in Falstaff or Mme de Guermantes. To have imagined these. (Language & Silence: 21)
  •  From The Retreat from the Word
The Apostle tells us that in the beginning was the Word. He gives us no assurance as to the the end.
It is appropriate that he should have used the Greek language to express the Hellenistic conception of the Logos, for it is to the fact of its Greco-Judaic inheritance that Western civilization owes its essentially verbal character. We take this character for granted. It is the root and bark of our experience and we cannot readily transpose our imaginings outside of it. We live inside the act of discourse. But we should not imagine that a verbal matrix is the only one in which the articulations and conduct of the mind are conceivable. There are modes of intellectual and sensuous reality founded not on language, but on other communicative energies such as the icon or the musical note. And there are actions of the spirit rooted in silence. It is difficult to speak of these, for how should speech justly convey the shape and vitality of silence? But I can cite examples of what I mean...
...The tools of mathematical analysis transformed chemistry and physics from alchemy to the predictive sciences they now are. By virtue of mathematics, the stars move out of mythology into the astronomer's table. And as mathematics settles into the marrow of a science, the concepts of that science, its habits of invention and understanding, become steadily less reducible to those of common language.
It is arrogant, if not responsible, to invoke such basic notions in our present model of the universe as quanta, the indeterminacy principle, the relativity constant of the lack of parity in so-called weak interactions of atomic particles, if one cannot do so in the language appropriate to them — that is to say, in mathematical terms. Without it, such words are phantasms to deck out the pretence of philosophers or journalists. Because physics has had to borrow from the vulgate, some of these words seem to retain a generalized meaning; they give a semblance of metaphor. But this is an illusion. When a critic seeks to apply the indeterminacy principle to his discussion of action painting, or of the use of improvization in certain contemporary music [or of Minimalist syntax? NGD], he is not relating two spheres of experience; he is merely talking nonsense**...
  • From To Civilize our Gentlemen
...[T]he student of literature now has access to and responsibility towards a very rich terrain, intermediate between the arts and science, a terrain bordering equally on poetry, on sociology, on psychology, on logic, and even on mathematics. I mean the domain of linguistics and of the theory of communication.
Its expansion in the post-war period is one of the most exciting chapters of modern intellectual history. The entire nature of language is being re-thought and re-examined as it has not been since Plato and Leibniz. The questions being asked about the relations between verbal means and sensory perception, about the ways in which syntax mirrors or controls the reality-concept of a given culture, about the history of linguistic forms as a record of ethnic consciousness — these questions go to the very heart of our poetic and critical concern. The precise analysis of verbal resources and grammatical changes, which may soon be feasible by means of computers — these may have a bearing on literary history and interpretation. We are within reach of knowing the rate at which new words new words enter a language. We can discern graphic contours and statistical patterns relating linguistic phenomena to economic, sociological changes. Our whole sense of the medium is being re-evaluated.
Let me give only two examples which are familiar to any student of modern linguistics. There is a Latin American Indian language, indeed there are a number, in which the future — the notion of that which is yet to happen — is set at the back of the speaker. The past, which he can see, because it has already happened, lies all before him. He backs into the future unknown; memory moves forward, hope backwards. This is the exact reversal of the primary co-ordinates by which we ourselves organize our feelings in root metaphors. How does such a reversal affect literature or, in a larger sense, to what extent is syntax the ever renewed cause of our modes of sensibility and verbal concept? Or take the well-known instance of the astounding range of terms — I believe it is in the region of one hundred — by which the gauchos of the Argentine discriminate between the shadings of a horse's hide. Do these terms in some manner precede the perception of the actual nuance of colour, or does that perception, sharpened by professional need, cause the invention of new words? Either hypothesis throw rich light on the processes of poetic invention and on the essential fact that translation means the meshing of two different world images, of two different patterns of human life (Language & Silence: 86-87)

Of course, there is much to disagree with in Steiner's writing. Take, for example, his easy acceptance of what might be called 'the Whorfian fallacy': his discussion of the colour terms of Argentinian gauchos immediately calls to mind the old saw about the Eskimos having a hundred words for snow (see Geoff Pullum's corrective The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax). It is also true that much of Steiner's writing reflects a near obsessive concern with the Holocaust and with Germany and the German language. As understandable as this may be, given his personal history and the immediate post-war period that informed his criticism, this concern overshadows many of his insights, at times to the point of obscurity. In spite of all this, though, one cannot help but be respectful of the scholarship, engaged by the writing, and impressed by the humanism. To read more, click on the links below, or borrow the books from your university library.





*Ill-translated by dict.cc as 'along the lines of'. One of the great things about Steiner's writing, but perhaps also a reason why he is less read than he deserves to be, is that he freely mixes French, German, Italian, Latin and Greek terms and quotations into his English writing, without pandering glosses or translations: in other words, he assumes that his reader is an educated European. Unfortunately, as he himself is painfully aware, this is simply not true, the complacent—often willful—ignorance of foreign languages among even highly educated people being one of the most unattractive features of middle-class British and American chauvinism.

**In a footnote, Steiner comes close to retracting this last comment. On balance, my own judgement is that the original assertion was correct: most analogies to physics and mathematics—in formal linguistics, at least— are more pretentious than insightful.

Sunday 9 January 2011

Defining Goals (continued)

[This is a draft excerpt from Chapter 2 of a proposed monograph on Vietnamese, in which I try to tackle some general theoretical problems. As ever, I really would appreciate comments, and will incorporate feedback in future drafts. Thank you. PS. If you wish to cite this, please reference it as Duffield, Nigel Particles and Projections in Vietnamese Syntax, draft ms., University of Sheffield.]

...Part of the difficulty here stems from an inconsistency within Chomsky’s own writings about the goals of generative theory. On the one hand, there is the notion of Explanatory Adequacy, which as just discussed asserts a direct inferential relationship between a particular analysis of some core properties of grammar and the ability of children to acquire their native language. I shall return to this notion presently. On the other hand, in separate passages (1981, 1985, 1988, etc.) Chomsky has explicitly and consistently distinguished questions about language knowledge from those of language acquisition, in terms that again should be very familiar. The following excerpt from Chomsky (1988) is representative:
(i) What is Knowledge of Language? What is in the mind/brain of the [adult native] speaker of English or Spanish or Japanese?; (ii)  How does this system of knowledge arise in the mind/brain? How is this knowledge put to use in speech (and secondary systems such as writing)?; (iii) What are the physical mechanisms that serve as the material basis for this system of knowledge and for the use of this language? (Chomsky 1988: 3).

Chomsky’s “three questions”—which crucially are five—notionally distinguish epistemological from psychological or physiological concerns. As such, they have been used to demarcate separate disciplines: Linguistics, Psycholinguistics, and Neurolinguistics, respectively. If one takes the first of these questions (What is Knowledge of Language?) as a starting point, rather than the notion of Explanatory Adequacy, then not only does the generativist approach to theory construction become much more perspicuous, but the practice of neglecting acquisition data becomes markedly more understandable. Primarily, this is because the goal of linguistic theory can then be stated as the development of an abstract Theory of Linguistic Knowledge: a Level 1 (Computational) Theory, in the sense of Marr (1982).[i]  By definition, such a theory is at least one step removed from questions of psychological representation or process, and several more steps removed from issues of neurophysiological implementation.[ii]

Notice, however, that Chomsky implicitly identifies a Level 1 question—What is Knowledge of Language?—with what is properly a Level 2 question—namely, What is in the mind/brain of the [adult native] speaker of English or Spanish or Japanese?—implicitly treating the second as a paraphrase of the first.[iii] For Chomsky and many mainstream generativists,[iv] the identification of these two questions is natural and unproblematic, and this is the crux of the difficulty: for reasons that I suppose are once again ultimately grounded in apriori commitment to innateness, Mainstream Minimalism assumes that essentially the same grammatical knowledge is in the mind/brain of the adult speaker of any language, be it English, Spanish, Japanese…or Vietnamese, and thus that there is no theoretically interesting variation in L from one language to the next. This is explicit in the following quote:
‘In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, assume languages to be uniform, with variety restricted to easily detectable properties of utterances. (Chomsky 2001:2)’
This assumption is licensed by the identification of L (a theory of the attained knowledge of a particular language) with FL (a theory of the initial state). The following quotation is instructive:
I understand L (for me, some variety of English) to be an attained state of a genetically-determined faculty of language FL... (Chomsky, cited in Stemmer 2009).
In fact, it is reasonable to conclude from much of Chomsky’s writing that the only theoretically relevant (or interesting) properties of L are those that also properties of FL. This strict identification of L with FL constitutes a theoretical watershed of sorts for many linguistic researchers: certainly, it is one of the clearest points of divergence between the perspective adopted in this monograph and that of Mainstream Minimalism, inasmuch as I am open to the idea that many of the interesting features (including universal properties) of L are emergent properties of particular grammatical systems).[v]
To ground this discussion—which has already become unduly abstract—the question that this monograph attempts to answer is the following more explicitly stated version of Chomsky’s second question (that is, “question (1b)”):
(Leaving aside Saussurean arbitrariness), what syntactic knowledge is in the mind/brain of the adult native speaker of Vietnamese, and how does this differ from that of the grammatical knowledge in the mind/brain of the adult native-speaker of Chinese or Thai or English?
Implicit here—contrary to Mainstream Minimalist assumptions—is the suggestion that there are significant, theoretically interesting differences between the attained state of LViet and (as it might be) the attained state of LEnglish, and also the assumption that a formal theory of L can and should describe and explain those differences: that is to say, that local variation arising from linguistic experience and interaction during language development is an intrinsic property of particular theories of L, not simply a contingent property of the interfaces between an invariant syntax and an arbitrary lexicon. Ideally, the same theory should also account for the structural commonalities between LViet and LEnglish, as well as for the absence of certain types of non-occurring L’s; see, for example, Pinker & Jackendoff (2009), for discussion of this point. Absent from this question, it should be noted, is any direct reference to FL (the theory of the initial state) either as an explanatory device or as a justification for empirical inquiry.[vi]

Of course, it may turn out that there are no interesting grammatical differences between LViet and LEnglish (‘beyond Saussurean arbitrariness’), and that the formal commonalities across languages are then best explained in terms of the initial state (FL): in other words, that Chomsky’s various identifications are justified. But given this construal of the goals of linguistic theory, these become entirely distinct empirical questions of fact, not apriori assumptions. And while there may be reasons to hope—at least to those favourably predisposed to the overall generativist programme—that there are universally shared properties of attained states, it is worth noting that the results of fifty years of research into (surface) language universals have led many to the conclusion that this hope is a vain one (Evans & Levinson 2009, and supportive commentaries). Nevertheless, as discussed in Duffield (2010) and further below, this may tell us very little about FL, where I believe there are more grounds for optimism.

An Aside: Taxi Drivers and the Initial State

In order to appreciate the difference in perspective that results from the dissociation of theories of the initial state (FL) from those of the attained grammatical knowledge of a particular language (LEnglish, LViet, etc), it is instructive to consider the development to steady state of other localized and specialized cognitive skills that also have a significant innate component. 

One pertinent example is human spatial memory, as it applies to navigational skills. It is uncontroversial to claim that the capacity to record spatial information about one’s environment, and to use this stored knowledge to navigate through space in daily life, is in certain crucial respects innate: all arguments that might be adduced from Poverty of Stimulus, lack of negative evidence, absence of instruction, relatively uniform success in threshold acquisition, selective neuropsychological breakdown, and so forth, apply equally to the development of spatial memory as to language, such that it is appropriate to speak of a spatial memory faculty (‘FSM’). Moreover, there is general consensus about neural localization of spatial memory: in all mammals, the hippocampus is crucially implicated in the storage and processing of memories about spatial positioning and orientation; while in humans, there is also believed to be an asymmetric involvement of neocortical structures in spatial memory, with significantly greater right hemisphere involvement in processing spatial memory (see, for example, Nunn et al, 1999).

For reasons that seem to have little to do with the intrinsic properties of the phenomena themselves, and almost everything to do with folk psychology, people strongly, if erroneously, believe that they teach their children language, but don’t believe that they (need to) teach their children to remember where their bed is, or how to find the back yard. In other words, the initial state of the FSM is of little theoretical interest to Cognitive Psychology, since its innateness is uncontentious. By contrast, what is of central interest to psychological theories of spatial memory is the characterization of the attained steady states, developmental changes in spatial memory representations, and the extent to which interaction with the environment can produce adaptive changes in cognitive representation and processing.

A dramatic example of such adapation beyond the initial state is provided by the findings of Maguire et al. (2000), who studied the neurophysiological correlates of acquired spatial navigation skills in London taxi-drivers: the researchers found that the posterior regions of the hippocampi of taxi-drivers were significantly larger than those of a control group, that the anterior portions were significantly smaller; furthermore, that this physical asymmetry increased with years of taxi-driving experience. Results such as these provide striking evidence of adult adaptations in brain regions associated with spatial memory and navigation. The point of this example is that adequate theories of spatial memory, however concerned they may be with general, universal properties of this mental faculty, treat their object of inquiry as an adaptive, dynamic system of knowledge, whose character is partially determined by local environmental factors, and which is subject to theoretically interesting variation (even if this variation is ultimately constrained by biology). An adequate theory will accommodate and explain this emergent variation and identify as precisely as possible which properties of the input are able to induce adaptation in the internalized system of knowledge. A theory of spatial memory that restricted attention only to apriori or initial state knowledge, and which dismissed all subsequent development or relegated such variation to ‘legibility conditions at the interface’ would hardly be considered ‘explanatorily adequate’.[vii]

Returning to language, my judgment is that the Innateness question has led many Minimalists to a near obsessive concern with the initial state of the language faculty (FL). This obsession has antagonized, and continues to provoke, a significant segment of the Cognitive Science community. More importantly however, it has distracted attention from arguably more interesting questions about attained states and the constraints on variation in adult grammars (L). Whether one accepts the innateness and domain-specificty of the capacity for language creation linguistic—as I do—or rejects it (as do many others), should be largely irrelevant to understanding and developing theories of steady state knowledge (just as, for the most part, theories of human genetics and embryology have been irrelevant to cognitive theories of spatial memory). Dissociating FL from L, as is proposed here, and focussing attention on the latter allows one to ask much more dispassionate questions about observed commonalities and differences across I-languages, and about the design properties of theories of L, without the distraction of a set of particular ideological commitments (and the concomitant impulse to trivialize variation while accentuating apparent similarities).

[to be continued]

[i] It should be noted that Chomsky himself directly rejects the relevance of Marr’s levels for linguistic inquiry:
“As for Marr's famous three levels of analysis, he was concerned with input-output systems (e.g., the mapping of retinal images to internal representations). Language is not an input-output system. Accordingly, Marr's levels do not apply to the study of language, though one could adapt them to the very different problem of characterizing cognitive systems accessed in processing and production (Chomsky, cited in Stemmer 2009).”
There is much that one might take issue with here, but this is not an appropriate place for such a debate.
[ii] It is at least debatable whether Linguistic Theory—or Cognitive Psychology more generally—really has, or should aspire to, this “Level 1 status”: see Peacocke (1986a, 1986b) and commentaries, cf. Laurence (2003), Soames (2008), for discussion, or indeed, whether such a classification is relevant to linguistics at all (Chomsky denies this: see previous note). But if one assumes this to be the case, then the generative perspective on questions concerning “lower level” theories becomes much more understandable: it would seem absurd to deny that if Knowledge of Language (KOL) is mentally represented that it should not be put to use in language comprehension and production, or that it should be physiologically represented in any other part of the body than in areas of the brain associated with higher cognition: the job of the psycholinguist and neurolinguist, respectively, then comes to be to determine precisely how KOL is put to use in processing language, how it is acquired, and how it is neurophysiologically realized (i.e, Questions “two” and “three” (really, three and five)).
[iii] This move immediately recalls a different, though equally unhelpful case of “systematic ambiguity”, namely, that concerning grammar:
Using the term ‘grammar’ with a systematic ambiguity to refer, first, to the native speaker’s internally represented ‘theory of his language’ and, second, to the linguist’s account of this, we can say that the child has developed and internally represented a generative grammar in the sense described. […] we are again using the term ‘theory’ — in this case ‘theory of language’ rather than ‘theory of a particular language’ — with a systematic ambiguity to refer both to the child’s innate pre-disposition to learn a language of a certain type and to the linguist’s account of this (Chomsky 1965: 25).
[iv] Notwithstanding the prior quote from Chomsky (1975) above.
[v] An imperfect, but passable analogy here might be to theories of automobile construction in a world where car engines were sealed at the factory door: the Mainstream Minimalist assumption would be that all cars (Ferraris or Fords) are powered by precisely the same engine—whatever is built up around this core represents only superficial difference. The alternative Minimalist view assumes certain fixed and abstract initial conditions—for example, all engines might be assumed derive power through internal combustion, or to transmit power to the driveline via a transmission system: beyond these abstract design properties, the alternative Minimalist view would admit a large range of ‘locally optimal’ solutions to the problem/fact of ground propulsion.  (The principal imperfections of this analogy are of course that the car engine, unlike the language faculty, is an inorganic, manufactured construct, whose theory is largely defined by its function: as a consequence, it is physically and functionally separable from the rest of the system in which it is embedded, and shows no positive development or growth from the point of initial manufacture to ultimate scrappage. Only the most extreme nativist would claim that the latter characteristics are properties of the language faculty.)
[vi] It should be stressed that I do not consider questions about the initial state FL to be irrelevant to present concerns. On the contrary: the following stages of this discussion are intimately and directly concerned with such issues. However, the point is that I assume that there can be very different answers to the questions—What is L?, What is FL?—respectively (especially where L = LEnglish, arguably less so where L = LViet); also, that cross-linguistic grammatical differences are theoretically at least as interesting as cross-linguistic universals.
[vii] Similar remarks apply to theories of musical competence; see Duffield (2011c).