Lardiere’s reflections on Minimalist mechanisms of second language acquisition are as timely as they are thought-provoking. As is perhaps inevitable, empirical work in acquisition tends to lag behind the theory that drives it, and such articles are invaluable in helping to “reset default values” in our theorizing. Of course, there is some irony—and possibly more than coincidence—in the distinctively retro flavour of both revisions: just as the move from GB to Minimalism rehabilitates an earlier phase of generative theory (Chomsky 1957,1964, 1965), so Lardiere steps back to the future in drawing out the valuable aspects of Lado’s (1957) proposals (while ‘putting aside the “behaviorist” baggage of contrastive analysis…(ms. p 49’)). Whether such retrospection is to be welcomed as a belated appreciation of past scholarship, or lamented as a failure of imagination, is something I cannot clearly decide on: either way, the sixties are clearly in again, and reflected the anachronistic title of this note (with thanks to The Who).[1]
Lardiere’s paper raises (reawakens?) at least three concerns one might have about the assumptions underlying this type of approach to second language acquisition. Here, I shall briefly mention the first—which may be better addressed by other commentators—and elaborate further on the latter two, where my knowledge is somewhat more secure.
1. What does formalization buy us?
The first concern has to do with the implicit assumption that formalization of the problem of second language acquisition necessarily moves us closer to an explanation or deeper understanding. More specifically, the question is whether translation of pre-theoretical notions such as plurality, collectivity, specificity or definiteness into a calculus of feature values advances our understanding of acquisitional mechanisms. Note that this is not the more dog-eared question of whether or not formalization is desirable in general: there are good arguments going back to Suppes (1968) suggesting that in certain domains—including grammatical theory—this is the case. Rather, the question is whether formalization of this particular kind benefits either the SLA researcher in understanding language acquisition, or the second language learner in implementing it.[2] Concretely, when Lardiere asserts (ms. p. 27) that:
‘[Patty]…has acquired knowledge that English plural marking can co-occur with non-human, quantified, and indefinite nouns, and in this sense, she has successfully “reassembled” the features associated with English plural marking from the way they are organized in Chinese,’it is reasonable to ask whether the second half of this sentence adds anything to our knowledge of Patty’s competence. It may be that it does, but it is not self-evident.
2. Do native speakers converge?
The second assumption necessary for Lardiere’s project to get off the ground is that naïve adult native-speakers show clear evidence of strong convergence on the same set of feature-values, as demonstrated through production and judgment data. By naïve speakers, I mean non-linguists from a variety of social and educational backgrounds; by strong convergence is intended something more stringent than the kind of ‘threshold convergence’ typically observed in generative SLA experiments, where the need to make stimuli accessible to beginning and intermediate language learners results in ceiling effects for native-speaker controls (who may or may not converge under a more fine-grained analysis).
There are actually two causes for concern here—or perhaps two aspects of the same worry, it’s difficult to be sure. The first is prompted by work showing that university-educated second language learners reliably outperform less-educated native-speakers in relatively straightforward judgment and comprehension tasks. For example, in experiments conducted by Dabrowska & Street (2006)—see also Dabrowska (1997)—less-educated native-speakers actually performed below chance (36% correct), when asked to identify the “doer” in implausible passive sentences such as The cat was chased by the mouse: this result compared with above-90% performance by two groups of non-native speakers in the same condition of the study. Now, one response to results such as these may be to adopt the position of Gleitman & Gleitman (1979), who, when faced with a very similar discrepancy between different groups of native-speakers,[3] concluded that:
‘Language-judgment functions [across native-speakers are] orthogonal to language functions…We suppose that individual differences in language behavior occur more severely at the judgmental level than at the speech and comprehension level...That is, we claim the differences in tacit knowledge are small in comparison to differences in the ability to make such knowledge explicit…(Gleitman & Gleitman, 1979:123)’,In other words, substantial variability in native-speaker proficiency—that is to say, task-specific performance relative to some presumed target behaviour—need not necessarily reflect any difference in underlying competence.
Whatever one’s opinion of the validity of this ploy, it raises some awkward questions for second language research. On the one hand, if one wants to maintain that less-educated native-speakers are just as competent as more-educated speakers in spite of the behavioral evidence to the contrary, then that same kind of evidence cannot be used to draw any inferences about the underlying competence of second language learners (one way or the other). This then is a perfectly legitimate move, but it does sharply narrow the empirical base. Conversely, if one concludes that such tasks only tell us about language proficiency—but if proficiency rather than competence is the really important thing, and a property that distinguishes among native-speakers also—then we should perhaps worry less about abstract features, and more about the acquisition of whatever it is that allows (first or second) language learners to achieve successful levels of performance in that language. At the very least, results like these should give us pause: if less-educated native-speakers cannot reliably interpret implausible passive sentences in a straightforward comprehension task, the prospects of their successfully distinguishing between, say, plural and collective readings, or direct vs. inverse scope interpretations in sentences with multiple quantifiers, using standard methods of elicitation, are doubtful at best.[4]
The other worry is that there may be no strong convergence—even among educated native-speakers—with respect to the sorts of subtle interpretive effects that Lardiere wishes to attribute to particular arrangements of underlying feature-values. To put it bluntly, we need to be sure that the intuitive judgments of individual linguists on core data are shared, at least by other educated speakers: if this is not the case, it is unreasonable to expect as much of second language learners. [5],[6] Once again, the available evidence is often less than secure. Two examples serve to illustrate the problem. The first comes from Lardiere’s own detailed discussion of the distribution and interpretation of various kinds of ‘plural’ markers in Korean, in which in passing, she refers to E. Suh’s (2007) observation about a possible interaction with animacy:
Although E. Suh (2007) mentions that pluralization is dispreferred on nonhuman nouns, her own Korean L2 acquisition study apparently showed no significant difference among native Korean-speaking controls in producing plurals on animals vs. humans, and C.-S. Suh (1996) states that ‑tul can be attached to both animate and inanimate nouns (ms. p. 32).
The clear implication here is that E. Suh was mistaken in her initial judgment, and that Korean speakers’ use of -tul is unconstrained by animacy restrictions. But it could very easily have been otherwise: had not Suh carried out an acquisition study, or had the study confirmed her intuition, we might well be asking how second language learners come to reorganise their set of nominal features so as to respect this distinction.
This problem calls to mind the second example, which has to do with scope interactions in sentences containing multiple quantifiers. This is a phenomenon that has received a good deal of attention in generative SLA—see e.g. Miyamoto & Yamane (1996), Miyamoto & Takata (1998)—because it seems to neatly exemplify a subtle interpretive contrast at once underdetermined by the input, and at the same time parameterized. In the theoretical literature, it has been claimed that languages vary parametrically according to whether they observe scope rigidity effects, such that the surface word-order strictly determines the relative scope of quantifiers: see for example, May (1985), Aoun & Li (1993). Within the type of feature-based theory espoused by Lardiere, the difference between languages that exhibit scope rigidity and those that do not is cashed out in terms of different valuations of (uninterpretable) features. The problem, though, is that linguists who should know strongly disagree on the facts of the matter. The following excerpts from Kuno, Takami & Wu (2001) reveal the extent of the controversy:
In Kuno et al 1999 we pointed out that (i) there are ambiguous sentences that Aoun & Li 1993 predicts to be unambiguous, and (ii) there are unambiguous sentences that their analysis predicts to be ambiguous. Examples 18 and 19 illustrate the first point, and 20 the second [examples not shown]…Referring to other ambiguous examples in Kuno et al 1999, Aoun and Li say that there is a disagreement about the data discussed’ (200: 140). For example, taking up the Japanese sentence in 22 [not shown]…they write that ‘we...relied on Hoji (1985), which indicates sentences such as (22) are unambiguous’ (2000: 140). However it is important to note that the example Aoun & Li 1993 provides, attributed to Hoji, is not 22, but the following [23: not shown]…Sentence 23 is indeed unambiguous, but 22 is ambiguous for many speakers of Japanese. We attribute this difference in scope to pragmatic factors… (Kuno et al, 2001: 140).The implications for SLA of such disagreements should be obvious: if theoreticians cannot agree on such relatively well-studied phenomena as scope interactions, the success (or otherwise) of second language learners in converging on subtle judgments may be relatively uninstructive. At a minimum, such disputes should force us to be much more circumspect about the assertions made in any single study—however well-regarded—than Lardiere appears to be, for instance, about the work of Kwon & Zribi-Hertz (2001). As Kuno et al (2001) state:
We cannot overemphasize the danger of building syntactic generalizations on the basis of a few unambiguous/unacceptable sentences that first come to mind. Some or all of these sentences may be unambiguous/unacceptable for nonsyntactic reasons, and sentences of the same pattern might be ambiguous/acceptable if they were free from the nonsyntactic factors that made the initial set unambiguous/ unacceptable (p. 142).In short, the empirical base of feature-based acquisition theory is much less secure—and possibly more restricted—than is generally acknowledged: this must have significant consequences for acquisition theory.
3. What about the children?
Finally, I wish to consider one other assumption that underlies Lardiere’s proposal, and which seems to be crucial for her project. This is the assumption that monolingual children are fully competent with respect to the featural properties of the lexical items they know and use: that whatever the shortcomings of adult second language learners in studies of ultimate attainment, children acquiring their first language get it right…and get it early. That Lardiere subscribes to this view is reasonably clear from the following quotes:
In part because languages vary and because any normal child exposed over a few years in early childhood to any human natural language will acquire it equally well, it has been argued that there is a universal set or inventory of linguistic features available to the child as part of the human genetic endowment, along with a species-uniform computational mechanism that combines and interprets the relevant features in a highly constrained way (ms., p2)…‘Since relative or comparative ease of learning is not an issue in L1 acquisition—that is, young children learn the language of their community, whatever it is, equally “easily”… (ms., p 16).Of course, the idea that children acquire the grammar of their language perfectly, effortlessly, and early is by no means restricted to Lardiere: the following quotations from Hawkins (2001) and White (2003) are representative of the mainstream view in generative second language research:
‘Children typically acquire all the major structures of their language by the age of three-and-a-half, and by the age of five their understanding of complex and subtle structural distinctions is effectively adult-like (Hawkins 2001: 6)’
‘The arguments for some sort of biological basis to L1 acquisition are well-known …the ability to acquire language is independent of intelligence; the pattern of acquisition is relatively uniform across different children, different languages and different cultures; language is acquired with relative ease and rapidity and without the benefit of instruction; children show creativity which goes beyond the input that they are exposed to. All of these observations point to an innate component to language acquisition (White 2003).’
No doubt, much hangs on the hedges in these statements (“effectively”, “typically”; “relatively”), but the implication is clear: young children have it all worked out by around five years of age. As someone who spends the greater part of his time in first language research, I am continually struck by the optimism displayed by second language researchers about young children’s language abilities. For the fact is that—barring a very few precocious exceptions—children do not perform like little adults either in terms of spoken language comprehension and production, or with respect to their performance in judgment tasks. Instead, they behave (unsurprisingly!) like children, deviating in a variety of interesting and systematic ways from the adults around them. Pace Hawkins, there is simply no empirical evidence for the claim that ‘children…acquire all the major structures of their language by the age of three-and-a –half [my emphasis: NGD]’; nor am I aware of any first language researcher who has advanced such a claim. There is of course evidence supporting the view that children show sensitivity to subtle abstract constraints of the adult target grammar considerably in advance of their own productive capacities, and that they project far beyond the input in ways that are consistent with nativist explanations, but those are entirely different matters.
Indeed, there is some irony in the fact that whereas second language researchers assume that children converge early on adult grammar specifications, the leading proponents of nativism in first language acquisition, namely, Crain & Pietroski (2001), make their most compelling case for innateness on the strength of empirical work showing divergence between child and adult grammars, precisely in the area of (abstract) feature-values. As Crain & Pietroski write (2001:2):
‘Children in monolingual English environments acquire English, and not Italian or Chinese. But nativists should not be surprised if such children exhibit some German or Romance or East Asian constructions, absent any evidence for these constructions in the primary linguistic data. Indeed, theory-driven mismatches between child and adult language may be the strongest argument for a universal grammar, and against models according to which children construct hypotheses based on linguistic experience…[my emphasis: NGD].’This leaves SLA research in something of a quandary: if young monolingual children take their time in arriving at the correct set of feature-values—and this sets aside the two concerns discussed earlier—it becomes much less clear what the standard of comparison should be for second language learners. But things may be worse still, for it appears that even teenagers may not have acquired adult-like knowledge of grammatical feature-values. For reasons too involved to elaborate on here, there is a dearth of available data on the fine-grained syntactic knowledge of 9-18 year olds, but the studies that do exist reveal that development continues up at least up to late adolescence. One particularly telling result comes from a recent (unpublished) dissertation by Tihana Kras (Kras 2008), investigating L2 acquisition of narrow syntax by child and adult Croatian learners of Italian. The specific phenomenon of interest is sensitivity to constraints on clitic-climbing and auxiliary selection in Italian restructuring constructions, with respect to which—in two separate judgment tasks—the judgments of14-year old Italian native-speakers were significantly less target-like than those of adult L2 learners. This phenomenon (obligatory clitic-climbing) is one that is directly accounted for in Minimalism in feature-based terms, yet it is reasonably clear that 14-year old native-speakers know the lexical items, without (yet) knowing the associated features. Kras herself explains this discrepancy in terms of experience and exposure, and in the final analysis is forced to restrict the scope of her Interface Hypothesis to “phenomena that are highly represented in the input, as phenomena which occur rarely in the input might not be acquired for reasons independent of the type of knowledge they involve [my emphasis: NGD] (Kras 2008: 194).’
Once again, the implications of results like these for SLA in general, and for Lardiere’s project in particular, should be clear: the road to ultimate attainment may be a long one, even for native-speakers.
Summary
In summary, Lardiere’s ‘Thoughts’ are informed and inspiring, and certainly help to move the debate forward into the Minimalist age. At the same time however, we need to bear in mind just how difficult second language research really is: as I have tried to suggest here, at each remove from pure theory, matters become more and more complicated. It’s the theoreticians who have it easy!
References
Aoun, Joseph; and Li, Y-H. Audrey (1993). The Syntax of Scope.vol. 21: Linguistic Inquiry Monograph. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1957). Syntactic structures: Janua linguarum, nr. 4. s -Gravenhage,: Mouton.
— (1964). Current issues in linguistic theory: Janua linguarum. Series minor, nr. 38. The Hague,: Mouton.
— (1965). Aspects of The Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Crain, Stephen; and Pietroski, Paul (2001). Nature, Nurture and Universal Grammar. Linguistics and Philosophy 24, 139-186.
Dabrowska, Ewa (1997). The LAD goes to school: a cautionary tale for nativists. Linguistics 35 (735-766),
Dabrowska, Ewa; and Street, James (2006). Individual differences in language attainment: Comprehension of passive sentences by native and non-native English speakers. Language Sciences 28, 604-615.
Duffield, Nigel (2003). Measures of Competent Gradience. In The Lexicon-Syntax Interface in Second Language Acquisition, Van Hout;Hulk;Kuiken; and Towell (eds.), 97-127. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Gleitman, Henry; and Gleitman, Lila R (1979). Language use and language judgment. In Individual differences in language ability and language behavior, Fillmore;Kempler; and Wang (eds.), 103-126. New York: Academic Press.
Hawkins, Roger (2001). Second Language Syntax: Blackwell.
Kuno, Susumo;Takami, Ken-Ichi; and Wu, Yuru (2001). Response to Aoun and Li. Language 77 (1), 134-143.
Kras, Tihana (2008) L2 acquisition of the lexicon-syntax interface and narrow syntax by child and adult Croatian learners of Italian. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge.
May, Robert (1985). Logical Form: its structure and derivation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Miyamoto, Yoichi; and Yamane, Maki (1996). L2 Rigidity: the Scope Principle in L2 Grammar. In Proceedings of the 20th annual Boston University Conference on Language Development, Stringfellow;Cahana-Amitay;Hughes; and Zukowski (eds.), 494-505. Somerville, Massachusetts: Cascadilla Press.
Miyamoto, Yoichi; and Takata, Yasuko (1998). Rigidity effects and the strong/weak features in SLA. In Proceedings of the 22nd Boston University Conference on Languag3 Development, Greenhill;Hughes;Littlefield; and Walsh (eds.), 511-522. Somerville, Massachusetts: Cascadilla Press.
Suppes, Patrick (1968). The Desirability of Formalization in Science. The Journal of Philosophy 65 (20), 651-664.
White, Lydia (2003). Second language acquisition and Universal Grammar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Notes
[1] The eponymous movie and compilation album were released in 1979: however, the best-known tracks—My Generation, I Can See for Miles, Pinball Wizard etc—were all originally recorded in the nineteen sixties.
[2] To her great credit, Lardiere clearly distinguishes throughout the paper between “theory-as-linguist’s-construct” and “theory-as-learner’s-mental-state”, in particular, where she observes that the predictive value of a feature-based theory may be quite different for researchers vs. language learners. (See, for example, the discussion on: ms, p. 21 ‘For the researcher…For the second language learner, on the other hand, …). In so doing, she avoids the “systematic ambiguity” first introduced to linguistic theory in Chomsky (1965), which—it may be argued—has had at least as many negative as positive consequences for understanding language acquisition (whatever its value may be for pure theory):
Using the term ‘grammar’ with a systematic ambiguity to refer, first, to the native speaker’s internally represented ‘theory of his language’ and, second, to the linguist’s account of this, we can say that the child has developed and internally represented a generative grammar in the sense described. […] we are again using the term ‘theory’ — in this case ‘theory of language’ rather than ‘theory of a particular language’ — with a systematic ambiguity to refer both to the child’s innate predisposition to learn a language of a certain type and to the linguist’s account of this (Chomsky 1965: 25).
[3] ‘…When taxed, the average group focused on meaning and plausibility, while the highly educated group focused on the syntax even when meaningfulness was thereby obscured…(Gleitman & Gleitman 1979: 125).’
[4] Once again, it is entirely possible that all native-speakers do in fact make such distinctions (‘correctly’) unconsciously: as a card-carrying generativist, I remain optimistic that this is the case. However, the point here is that if a significant group of native-speakers cannot adequately demonstrate this ability, it becomes unreasonable to expect any more of second language learners.
[5] This becomes particularly difficult to assess in the case of less familiar languages, where one is heavily reliant on the judgments of bi-lingual native-speaker linguists, whose formal training has been through English.
[6] Though such situations do arise, as discussed in Duffield (2003).
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